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DRAFT

Reforming Section 10 and the Habitat Conservation Program
David A. Dana
Northwestern University

One of the central dilemmas of the Endangered Species Act is how to
foster species conservation and recovery on private land. Much of the habitat
thought to be occupied by endangered species is on private land. According
to some estimates, more than two thirds of listed endangered species can be
found on private land.1 And even in areas where there is substantial federal
land that contains critical habitat, the federal land often is part of a
patchwork of federal, state, local and purely private holdings. (Importantly,
the Act treats state and locally-owned land as private land.) In such cases,
any comprehensive recovery plan would need to extend to private land.
In theory, the Endangered Species Act powerfully addresses the risks
posed to endangered species by private development and other economic
activity on private land. Section Nine of the Act prohibits the "taking" of
endangered species on private land, and broadly defines "take."2 The Fish
and Wildlife Service's regulation implementing Section 9 clearly encompass
private development activity that kills or prevents the reproduction of
protected species members,3 and the United States Supreme Court upheld
that regulation in Sweet Home v. Babbitt.4
1

See Jodi Hilty & Adina M. Merenlender, Studying Diversity on Private
Land, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 132, 133 (2003) (stating that ninety-five
percent of endangered plant and animal species have some habitat on
private land); David S. Wilcove & Joon Lee, Using Economic and
Regulatory Incentives to Restore endangered Species: Lessons Learned
from Three New Programs, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 639, 640 (2004)
(explaining that an estimate that "private lands harbor at least one
population of two-thirds of all federally-listed species . . .is almost
certainly an underestimate").
2
The Act defines "take" to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct." 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1).
3
The Department of Interior regulation defines "harm" to include
"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential

1

In practice, however, there have been relatively few Section Nine
enforcement actions brought by the government or Section Nine citizens
suits brought by private citizens. One reason that government regulators and
citizen groups may have found bringing Section Nine actions to be relatively
unattractive to pursue is that there generally is much less information
available to the government or the public regarding what is happening on
private land than there is regarding what is happening on federal land. In
addition, aggressive regulation of private land generally is much more
controversial politically and troubling to judges than aggressive regulation of
federal land. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Sweet Home
expressed some concerns about the legality of any aggressive applications of
Section 9 pursuant to the FWS regulation.5 Moreover, the sheer number of
private holdings with endangered species populations, when coupled with
the high costs of government enforcement or citizen suit litigation, means
that only a fairly small percentage of plausible Section Nine actions could
ever be brought.
Perhaps because there have been relatively few Section 9 actions, most of
the attention with respect to the preservation of species on private land has
focused on a different section of the Act -- Section 10. Enacted as part of
amendments to the Act in 1982, Section 10 allows the Secretary of the
Interior to permit incidental takings of endangered species that otherwise
would be illegal under Section Nine. An "incidental take" is one where the
harm to the species is not intentional -- that is, it is not the goal of the
landowner's action -- but is rather incidental to the landowner's activities on
the land (such as clearing scrub with habitat as part of an effort to build a
new residential subdivision). According to Section 10, the Secretary may
grant an incidental take permit only in conjunction with an approved habitat
conservation plan or HCP.6

behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."
C.F.R. § 17.3
4

50

515 U.S. 687 (1995)

5

Of course, even a modest threat of a government or citizen suit under
Section Nine may deter some landowners from "taking" or arguably taking
species on their land. Thus, Section Nine certainly does have an
impact beyond those cases in which litigation is initiated under
Section Nine. Measuring that impact, however, would be exceedingly
difficult.
6
See 16 USC Sec 1539.
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Section 10 anticipates a two-part process -- an application by a
landowner that includes a conservation plan, and the discretionary approval
of the conservation plan by the Secretary based on certain required findings.
The landowner's submitted conservation plan must specify, among other
things, "the impact which will likely result from [the] taking," what steps the
applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts," "the funding that
will be available to implement such steps" and "what alternative actions to
such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why such alternatives
are not being utilized." The Secretary may grant the permit only upon
finding that the "taking will be incidental," "the applicant will, to the
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such
taking," "the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be
provided," and, it would seem most critically, "the taking will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival or recovery of the species
in the wild."7
What is not in the text of Section 10 is important, particularly in light
of the controversies regarding the HCP program that are discussed below.
Section 10 does not really mandate serious public participation in the HCP
formation and approval process: the section merely references the need for
"public comment" prior to final decision by the Secretary. Nor is there any
provision regarding the quality of the scientific review needed for an HCP to
be approved, or the role of any scientific advisory committees. The funding
provision does require that the landowner/applicant prove adequate funding
for the carrying out of the steps in the plan, but says nothing about funding
for measures not included in the plan that may prove to be necessary to
secure the species survival or recovery. For example, where a plan just
prohibits a landowner from draining or contaminating a wetland on his land
that provides habitat to an endangered bird population, Section 10 on it face
would not seem to require that the landowner reserve funds to finance the
replenishment of the wetland or create of substitute wetlands in the event it
dries up during an extended heat wave or drought.
Section 10, indeed, says almost nothing about what happens after the
plan is approved. There is no cap on the length of the permit, and no
requirement of periodic reviews by the Secretary as to compliance with a
plan or, perhaps even more important, as to the actual condition of the
species population (regardless of whether there is plan compliance). The
7

16 USC Sec 1539 (

),

.
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Act provides only that "The Secretary shall revoke a permit issued under this
paragraph if he finds that the permittee is not complying with the terms and
conditions of the permit."8 That provision does not, in itself, require the
Secretary to take measures to find out if there is compliance, or to find out
whether compliance has proved insufficient to assure species survival and
recovery.
Section 10 and the entire concept of incidental permits and habitat
conservation plans had little practical impact prior to the Clinton
Administration: Only a dozen or so HCPs were approved in the first decade
after Section 10's enactment in 1992. And almost all of these involved
relatively small parcels of land, and had a single-species focus. Then, during
the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Interior Babbitt made HCPs a
centerpiece of species conservation. Approximately 300 HCPS had been
approved by the end of 2000, including a number of large-scale HCPs
encompassing vast areas of land. HCP activity continued during the Bush
Administration, such that more than 200 additional HCPs had received
approval by the end of 2007.9 It does appear, however, that there were fewer
proposals for ambitious HCPs during the Bush Administration, and less
attention in policymaking and academic circles to HCPs and their merits.
HCPs have not been a "hot topic" in recent years.
This may change: We may be at a moment of renewed attention to the
HCPs process and HCP outcomes, and perhaps fundamental HCP reform.
The HCP program is an example of what I have elsewhere called
"contractarian regulation" -- regulation in which the government and an
entity that would otherwise be subject to command-and-control regulation
contract into an alternative regulatory arrangement that allows the entity to
avoid some formal requirements while allowing the government to require
actions on the part of the entity that go beyond the scope of current formal
legal mandates. In contractarian regimes, the private actors are willing to
enter into "voluntary" contract-like arrangements and take on binding
commitments thereby because the threat of the imposition of command-andcontrol regulation is real enough that it is worthwhile to contract out of that
threat.10 To the extent that "the Services" (the Fish and Wildlife Service of
8

16 U.S.C. Sec 1539 (
).
Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Regulation, 55 UCLA L REV293, 308 (2007);
10
David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U ILL L REV 35.
9
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the Department of Interior and NOAA, at the Department of Commerce)
under the Obama administration credibly can communicate a greater
willingness to consider Section 9 enforcement actions than they could under
the Bush Administration (which is plausible), landowners may well be more
willing to engage in the HCP process than they have previously been. From
the perspective of environmental groups and concerned policymakers and
citizens, moreover, renewed attention to HCPs also makes sense because the
general limitations in achieving preservation via Section Nine and other
provisions of the ESA remain (e.g., lack of information about private land,
formal limitation of regulatory authority to habitat of listed species only),
and, with climate change and continuing urbanization, the threats of species
extinction are greater than they ever have been.
This Chapter provides a framework for HCP reform. The Chapter first
briefly reviews the history of HCP regulations and guidance, and what we
know about HCPs in practice (which is limited). It offers a range of reforms
to address problems in the current HCP approach, including requirements
that the Services assemble a better database regarding current HCPs and
report to Congress on the program periodically; greater reliance on
programmatic regulations adopted after notice and comment; development
of guidelines for assessing the likely or possible environmental impacts of
HCPs upfront, at the time a HCP is proposed, and the development of
separate rules, processes and requirements for HCPS depending on the
possible range of impacts; enhancing citizen enforcement of at least highimpact HCPs by means of explicit authorization of citizen suits to enforce
HCPs, reliance on scientific advisory board (SAB) review to address the
scientific legitimacy objection with respect to high-impact HCPs;
development of public-private insurance to address the long-term
uncertainty posed by high-impact HCPs; and development of rules and plans
for greater reliance on conservation banks to address the long-term
uncertainty posed by smaller-scale, lower-impact HCPs.
The last two reforms would probably be the most controversial but
perhaps the most important. There is extraordinary uncertainty as to
whether HCPs will really work in stabilizing species populations let alone
achieving recovery, and that uncertainty is not simply an artifact of flaws in
how particular HCPs may have been put together to date. We really know
surprisingly little about how particular species populations in particular
settings will fare under different circumstances; and even when we know a
great deal, achieving species conservation and recovery can be daunting.
5

The federal government has spent billions on salmon recovery, and the very
limited success so far may soon be undone by climate change.11Uncertainties
abound not just as to how species populations will fare but as to our
understanding in the future of the importance of a given species for different
ecosystems. There may be -- there certainly are -- limits to how much any
program can deal with this long-term uncertainty but so far, the HCP
program has basically just ignored it and even .12
HCP Programs: A Brief History of Administrative Regulations and
Guidance
It is unclear whether, in 1982, when Section 10 was enacted, Congress
intended Section 10 to be the means by which the ESA would be effectively
transformed. On the one hand, the House Conference Committee Report for
the Amendments does suggest that the HCP process will "measurably reduce
conflicts . . . and will provide the institutional framework to permit
cooperation between the public and private sectors in the interest of
endangered species and habitat conservation" and directs the Secretary
Interior to "encourage creative partnerships between the public and private
sectors and among governmental agencies . . . . "13 On the other hand, the
legislative history re-affirms that HCPs are not intended to weaken the (very
strong) mandates of the ESA, and the language of Section 10 itself does not
codify a new or expanded vision for the ESA. The modest experience with
HCPs in the ten or so years after the adoption of the 1982 amendments,
moreover, tends to underscore how modest these amendments on their face
appear to be.
Beginning in 1994, however, Secretary Babbitt undertook a
remarkable transformation of the HCP program that had as its apparent
11

See, e.g., Rocky Barker, Efforts to save salmon may be undone by
climate change, Miami Herald, May 12, 2009,
www.miamiherald.com/news/environment/story/1044060.html; see also
Mathew Daly, AP, Feds Seek Delay in Developing NW Salmon Plan, May 1,
2009, available at http://www.wildsalmon.org. (describing ongoing
controversy over federal recovery plan).
12
The problem of uncertainty is as applicable to species on federal
land as it is to species on non-federal, private land, but at least to
date, no one has claimed that the federal government is ever relieved
under the terms of the Act from responding to uncertainty with new
protective measures on federal land, whereas the HCP program, as
implemented, appears in some cases (via the No Surprises Rule) to have
provided just such an assurance to private landowners.
13
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, at 31 (1982).
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mission transforming the ESA itself from a single-listed-species
management tool to a multi-species, ecosystem management tool that would
encompass species and species clusters that had not yet diminished to the
point of qualifying as endangered or that possibly had in fact diminished that
much, but had not made into onto the government's list, for whatever reason.
Secretary Babbitt's approach reflected a consensus that had emerged
regarding species preservation, a consensus that the singular focus of the
ESA on a single species at a time -- and then only on a single species once it
was on the verge of extinction and had been listed after an arduous and often
litigation-intensive process -- was untenable, from a biological point of
view, from an economic point of view, and ultimately from a political point
of view. According to Secretary Babbitt, the ESA's "train wreck" approach
to ecological interventions was akin to a transportation safety regime that
only came into play moments before two speeding trains were about to
collide (the two trains being a species on the brink and human economic
development at odds with preservation of the remnant population of that
species).
In the new consensus, earlier was better in terms of intervention, and
broader was better, in terms of the number of species and natural conditions
that garnered attention. In the new consensus, too, isolated animal
populations on tiny fragments of land were unsustainable and hence
undesirable. What was needed, according to the new consensus, were large
tracts of habitat or, where that was impossible, smaller areas connected by
protected habitat corridors.
Under Secretary Babbitt, the Department of Interior openly seized upon
the Section 10 permitting process and the HCP program to address some of
the perceived flaws in the basic approach of the ESA as written by Congress.
In particular, the Department of Interior promoted multi-species HCPs that
sometimes included the dedication of land for habitat corridors; some
species included in plans were not yet listed. Further, DOI focused on
providing incentives for landowners to take actions where there were as of
yet no listed species at all on the private land. In these arrangements,
landowners would receive protection against any future regulatory
interventions in return for their efforts to enrich habitat for species that were
not yet listed or to create habitat that would be suitable for new populations
of listed species.

7

As the HCP program developed in its ambitions, the cost of preparing
and complying with a HCP was one of landowners' concerns, but the
uncertainties of future regulatory treatment and regulatory burdens were an
even bigger one. The Department of Interior acted forcefully to address the
uncertainty-of-future-regulatory-treatment concern, giving rise to a "No
Surprises" Rule controversy that has not yet abated.
In 1994, the Department of Interior announced and then adopted the
so-called No Surprises Rule, without any meaningful opportunity for public
comment. The Rule has been subject to a series of legal challenges, which
later compelled DOI to accept public comments and codify the Rule in
regulations (it is also part of the HCP handbook). But throughout the
protracted, multi-part litigation, the substance of the Rule has remained the
same.14 Nonetheless, genuine questions can be raised as to whether the
courts should have permitted the No Surprises Rule to stand, and whether
the questionable legal legitimacy of the No Surprises Rule has undermined
the legitimacy of the HCP program to date. The plain text of the ESA does
not seem to authorize the Secretary of Interior to promise no surprises, no
matter what, as the No Surprises Rule does. Moreover, as a matter of basic
democratic theory, it is arguably troubling for regulators at any given point
in time to promise, in what purports to be a contractually binding way, that
the same regulatory treatment will be afforded ten or twenty or even fifty
years hence.15
Under the Rule, landowners who participate in an HCP receive a
guarantee that even if the plan fails to result in the survival (let alone
recovery) of a species population on the affected land, the landowners will
not be asked to do more except "under extraordinary circumstances" and
even then, what the landowners can be asked to do is quite limited and any
costs must be born by the government. Under the Rule, the government
cannot ask for the dedication of new land or other conservation measures of
a sort not already provided for in the plan even upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances. Only if the government can show extraordinary
circumstances can it ask for modifications on land already dedicated for
conservation, and, even then, the government must pay for such
14

For a good discussion of the history of the No Surprises Rule, see
Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the
Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 NYU Envtl L J 279(1998).
15
See generally David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Democracy,148 U PA L REV 473(1999).

8

modifications. Moreover, the protections for landowners apply to both listed
and non-listed species that are included in the habitat conservation plan. And
compliance with the plan -- and hence receipt of No Surprises protection -is presumed on the part of the holder of a valid incidental take permit under
Section 10. Finally, the DOI maintained that there is no maximum time
limit on HCPs -- and indeed, HCPs have been approved that last decades -and also no time limit on the No Surprises guarantee.
The No Surprises Rule is a helpful prism through which to understand
key areas of controversy about HCPs: the controversy over the scientific
grounding for HCPs, over the inclusion (or not) of biological goals, metrics
and adaptive management as part of the plans themselves, and the quality or
(or lack thereof) of monitoring for and reporting on compliance. Given the
No Surprises guarantee, it seems especially important that HCPs be based on
good data collection and best scientific understandings, as it will be costly or
impossible for the government to force a departure from the plan. Yet there
is significant evidence that some HCPs, including ones with potentially great
environmental consequences, have been based on little or inadequate
gathering and assessment of biological data. Second, given that No
Surprises means in effect no new measures outside the plan, it would seem
very important that the plan itself build in measures that take into account
possible changes in conditions and uncertainties, such as plan requirements
of meeting biological goals and undertaking adaptive management. Yet
clear biological goals and metrics for meeting the goals and meaningful
adaptive management requirements appear to be the exception rather than
the rule in HCPs, even major HCPs, or at best, the empirical evidence on
these points is incomplete. Finally, if compliance with the plan is to a large
degree all the government can ever demand and compliance is presumed, it
would seem key that landowners be required to engage in close monitoring
and report the results in a way that would allow enforcement actions to be
taken despite the presumption of compliance. But monitoring of compliance
of HCPs, despite the fact that HCPs do all contain monitoring requirements,
appears to be highly inconsistent.16 Enforcement by means of citizen suits
16

See Camacho, supra note [ ], at 323 (explaining that the "program's
monitoring and adaptation requirements have provided applicants and the
Services considerable flexibility and incentives to ignore monitoring
and evade adaptation"). The most comprehensive study to date, a study
conducted by the American Institute of Biological Sciences and the
National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis based on a sample
of 43 HCPs, found that only 22 of the 43 plans reviewed had a clear
monitoring program and that monitoring of HCPs is generally inadequate.

9

(or the threat of such suits) is undermined by the facts that HCP agreements
generally have not identified citizens or citizen groups as third-party
beneficiaries of the agreements and hence it is doubtful whether citizen
groups have standing to sue to enforce the terms of an HCP and
implementing agreements entered into by the federal government and the
landowner.17
Criticisms of HCPS in the wake of the No Surprises Rule crystallized
around a 1998 report from Defenders of Wildlife, the title of which, Frayed
Safety Nets, summarizes its central thesis regarding the reliability of HCPs in
ensuring species protection.18 In 1999, the Department of Interior reportedly
expressed a willingness to reform the HCP program to address concerns that
had been raised by these studies and other reports of problematic HCPs.
At the very end of the Clinton Administration, the Department of
Interior did adopt some very general, informal "guidelines" that addressed
some of the concerns raised by environmentalists. These guidelines were
never adopted as formal agency regulations (although they were added as an
as an addendum to the Department's HCP handbook after receipt of public
comment19). Moreover, the guidelines are vague and aspirational, not
prescriptive: the guidelines emphasize the importance of including in plans
biological goals, adaptive management mechanisms, monitoring
mechanisms, and public participation provisions, but do not commit the
agency to include any particular kinds of provisions or measures in all or
some categories of HCPs. Similarly, the guidelines acknowledge concerns
about the long duration of some HCPs, but do not commit the agency to any
particular duration limit for all HCPs or any categories of HCPs.

See http://www.fws.gov/Endangered/hcp/response.htm (describing the
study and the Fish and Wildlife Service's comments on it).
17
In addition, the citizen suit provision of the Act itself refers to
citizen suits for violations of "requirements" of the Act, 16 U.S.C Sec
1540(g)[CHECK], and it is unclear whether a provision in an HCP
implementing agreement is a requirement within the meaning of Section
11.
18
See Laura C. Hood, Frayed Safety Nets: Conservation Planning Under
the Endangered Species Act (1998), available at www.defenders.org/.
Reaching similar conclusions, a study in the American Scientist found
HCPs, overall, to be woefully lacking in scientific grounding. See
Laura Watchman et al, Science and Uncertainty in Habitat Conservation
Planning, American Scientist, Vol 89, pages 351 - [
] (Jul-Aug
2001)).
19
See http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/HCP/final_notice.pdf.
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Moreover, we have absolutely no way of knowing whether the DOI
has changed any of its practices with regard to new or existing HCPs since
2000. Congress has not required reporting to it on the HCP program, and no
reports have been forthcoming. Private NGOs and academics have not filled
the void. Perhaps one reason this is so is that DOI has not facilitated public
or NGO assessments by making what data it does have readily available:
there is no good, easy, accessible source on the specifics of each HCP,
including the specifics of any HCP amendments or any data on how the well
or not well the plan is working. The only centralized database for HCPs, the
Department of Interior's Environmental Conservation Online site, 20 is
inadequate. It includes many approved HCPs, but for each HCP, only the
barest bones information -- the name, the date of approval, the duration, and
at best a few words of description -- is provided. There is no way to discern
the actual contents of any HCP, including, the biological bases and goals of
the HCP (to the extent there are any clearly stated in the plans) and the
required conservation measures. Nor is there any way to discern how HCPs
within a single region geographically and ecologically relate to one another.
Is Stakeholder Participation The Answer?
Some commentators seem to suggest that the lack of mandatory,
sustained public participation in HCPs is the primary problem with them.21
They argue that HCPs should move from a bilateral negotiation model to a
multilateral consensus or collaboration model. Absent such participation, the
argument goes, it is simply too easy for agency officials to be, if not
captured, unduly influenced by, and too easy on, landowners. And
collaboration will produce useful information and insights that otherwise
would have been ignored.
More public participation would be valuable on the level of individual
HCPs, and perhaps there should be statutory and regulatory requirements for
enhanced public participation. (I think make one suggestion along these
lines, below.) But the emphasis on public participation as the key reform is
mistaken for several reasons. First, who constitutes the "public" and
legitimate public representatives is extremely contested. If environmental
20

See http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp.
See, e.g.,Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era
of Reinvention: the Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L Q 707
(1999); Anne B. Hulick, Habitat Conservation Plans: Protecting Species,
Enhancing Democratic Legitimacy and Promoting Stewardship Are Not
Mutually Exclusive Goals, 25 UCLA ENVTL L & POL'Y 441 (2006).

21
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NGOs are part of the public, is the local chamber of commerce as well?
Even as among NGOs, there are often a range of viewpoints and concerns,
so that it is impossible to equate any single, given NGO with the
"environmentalist" point of view or certainly with "the public interest."
Second, any inclusion of a broad range of "stakeholders" in land use
outcomes may make agreement extremely difficult to achieve or at least too
costly to achieve for landowners to tolerate, and inclusion without agreement
or consensus may add nothing but delay and hard feelings. As Brad
Karkkainen has observed, it is "highly unrealistic" to assume that we can put
a group of "stakeholders" in a room and have them reach a win-win solution
"insofar as it assumes that a Pareto-superior solution will be available for
every problem."22 Moreover, even when intensive public participation in
fact would not lead to breakdowns in plan development and long delays, it
will be hard for landowners to feel assured, ex ante, that that will not be the
case, and as a result of the uncertainty, they may avoid participating in the
HCP process.
Third, in some cases there will not be strong local stakeholders who
want to and are equipped to engage in meaningful public participation.
Some proposed HCPs will be in parts of the country with relatively weak
local NGOS and upon which national NGOs have not focused; NGOs also
may not be available or willing or able to commit to sustained participation
with regard to the many proposed HCPs in the future that may involve very
small land areas or arcane technical issues or decidedly non-charismatic
fauna. Indeed, it may be that reforms in the HCP process are most critical
for the category of HCPs that involve beneath-the-NGO/public-radar
locations and natural resources. Even where there is a great deal of NGO
interest, moreover, the NGOs that are involved may lack the sophistication
and resources to provide key technical and scientific information and argue
on the basis of such information or to effectively explain why more
scientific information and analysis are required. And even when a NGO can
produce such information, the information may be tainted by the perception
that the NGO is biased against any economic development or resource
extraction.
The problem with looking to public participation as the key reform is
illustrated by imagining what I am supposing (but certainly cannot prove) is
22

Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecossytem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA ENVTL L J 189,[
](2002).
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a reasonably typical HCP negotiation scenario: the agency officials want to
pragmatically but aggressively pursue conservation aims through an HCP
but they also need to obtain the landowner(s) consent and the landowners are
driving a hard bargain. In such a scenario, sustained public participation
could be helpful in generating information regulators could use and in giving
regulators some support as they seek concessions from the landowners. But
other things would be helpful too, and perhaps much more helpful, namely:
Congressional or agency regulatory requirements that make certain kinds of
provisions mandatory and hence something the regulators can explain
absolutely must be included in the plan, and proposed plan review by
scientific experts who have the training public participants may well lack
and whose analysis landowners cannot dismiss as biased, unlike the analysis
of public participants that landowners can label (and genuinely may perceive
as ) nothing more than NIMBY-ists or environmental extremists.
What Congress Can and Should Do
One essential category of Congressional reforms of the HCP program
would be information-forcing. The first thing Congress can do is amend
Section 10 to require the Services to collect and make public a complete
database on HCPs. Congress, too, should require the Services to report to
Congress on a periodic basis on both the provisions of individual HCPs and
the performance or results of HCPs. By requiring performance reporting,
Congress would incentivize the agency to pay more attention to monitoring
and reporting by permitees, and to demand data in support of permittee
reports. Government agencies such as DOI's Fish and Wildlife Service
invariably have more tasks than their resources allow them to pursue, and
given that, they have a natural tendency not to prioritize efforts and
investigations that could show that plans they approved have caused
environmental damage without producing offsetting or indeed any
environmental benefits. No organization seeks out criticism. That is why a
statutory mandate to report to Congress periodically on HCP performance is
needed. Reports to Congress also could result in more effective
participation by NGOs in ongoing debates over substantive reforms in the
HCP program.
Congress should also codify specific biological data gathering
requirements as part of HCPs proposals, more specific monitoring
requirements for HCPs, requirements of biological goals and metrics for
goals to be included in HCPs, and requirements for adaptive management
13

mechanisms in HCPs. Such requirements might be too expensive to be
sensible for all HCPS, so Congress should also direct the Department of
Interior to develop regulations for categorizing HCP proposals upfront
according to possible environmental impacts, and to develop different tiers
or grades of goal-setting and adaptive management depending on the impact
categorization.
The mandatory tiering of HCP proposals by likely or possible
environmental impact would be a substantial and important reform in and of
itself. The Department of Interior has established some special processes for
very small-scale, very-low-impact HCPs but otherwise has formally applied
the same requirements to massive regional HCPs and ones that affect a
relatively few parcels of land. The one-size-fits-all approach does not track
the real heterogeneity of the subject matter of HCPs. Moreover, by
mandating upfront tiering based on possible impacts and rooted in actual
evidence, a tiering regulation will help ensure that every HCP proposal is
formulated around some kind of initial biological survey or data collection -which should always be the case, but has not necessarily always been so.
Finally, as in the NEPA impact review process, it is critical that HCP
proposals be assessed based on likely or possible impacts taking into
consideration not just the land at issue but also cumulative effects and
related effects (such as the precedent the HCP will set for the management
of parcels with similar conditions, and interactions between private land and
federal land).23
Congress should also require that high-impact HCPs include a
provision authorizing citizen groups to being a suit against the HCP
permittee for substantial, continuing non-compliance with HCP
requirements.24 Citizen suits have been a central part of American
environmental law and enforcement, but the ESA does not on its face
authorize citizen suits for HCP non-compliance and (as noted above) HCP
plans and implementing agreements have not authorized them. The
possibility of a citizen suit is a powerful incentive for compliance, and
23

On the problem of cumlative effects, see Frayed Safety Nets, supra
note [ ], at 56-58; on NEPA, see L.W. Canter, Cumulative Effcets and
Other Analystic Challenges of NEPA, in Ray Clak & Larry W. Canter,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA (1997).
24
See Donald Baur & William Robert Irvin THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, at
356 (explaining the legal ambiguity surrounding citizen suit sto
enforce HCP provisions, and urging the adoption of "[r]egulations
requiring that HCPs identify citizens as third-party beneficiaries" in
order to "ensure effective enforcement of the ESA".
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provides an important back-up for the contingency of regulatory failure due
to lack of resources or political pressures. By the same token, however,
allowing citizen suits may discourage landowners from participating in the
HCP program. That is why citizen suits should be limited to high-impact
HCPs (where landowners have the most to gain from the HCP process and
compliance is the most important to ensure) and why suits should be limited
to substantial non-compliance and why the presumption of compliance under
the No Surprises Rule should continue to apply, such that a citizen group
would have to have to have some hard evidence of substantial beyond its
first court pleading.
Scientific Advisory Board Review
By statute, mandatory review by a scientific advisory board (SAB)
should be instituted for approval of a habitat conservation plan, at least for
any plan that is categorized as having moderate or high likely or possible
impacts, individually or cumulatively. Periodic SAB review (5 or 10 year
review) also may be appropriate for a statutory mandate. SAB review would
not fully address the concerns of some critics that the HCP process does not
contain enough opportunities for public participation and is not "democratic"
enough, but it would allow a certain degree of highly valuable participation
by independent, non-agency actors and would address the fundamental
concern about HCPs that they are sometimes are not well-founded on basic
scientific principles and/or data.
SAB members could not plausibly be discounted as NIMBY types or
professional environmental activists; at the same time, they would have
independence from both the government and landowners/permittees, and
hence could be expected to give expression to some of the same concerns
that the most sophisticated NGOs would be able to articulate. Moreover,
because each SAB member would have a term (perhaps two or five years)
and would review multiple HCPs, SAB members could develop an
understanding of the HCP program a whole and a working relationship with
agency officials. SAB reviewers could not be expected to do substantive
scientific studies regarding proposed HCPs but they could raise questions
and voice criticisms and ask for clarifications and the filling in of holes in a
way that could produce better HCPs, and screen out the most plainly
problematic HCP proposals.
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SAB review, moreover, could facilitate meaningful public
participation, just as could mandatory reports to Congress. SAB reviews of
proposals would be made public, including negative or split or qualified
reviews, and using those reviews, relevant NGOs and others could press
their case against approval of a proposed HCP or for cancellation or revision
of approved HCPs. One potentially useful statutory or regulatory mandate
would be that the DOI would be required to explain why it was not adopting
a SAB recommendation as part of its approval of an HCP, and would be
required to solicit public comments on this decision not to follow SAB
recommendations. Taken as a collective over time, moreover, SAB reviews
may provide the public with a more candid picture of the HCP program than
(inevitably somewhat self-serving) agency reports.
There are precedents for using SABs in the conservation context.
NOAA's fish recovery efforts in the Columbia River basin are reviewed by a
standing SAB that also reports to the various Indian Tribes.25 Moreover,
some individual HCPs have utilized scientific advisory boards. A study by
Hardin et al suggests that HCPs that were approved after SAB review had a
higher degree of scientific quality than those that employed steering
committees that were not dominated by scientists. The study concluded that:
One means of ensuring that current scientific information and approaches
are used within the HCP process is through the increased use of independent
scientists. When scientists, especially experts on the species covered by the
plan, were consulted, adequate and even high-quality plans were often
developed. . . . At present, scientific input is not required . . . and is often
lacking in the conservation planning process, yet it seems both reasonable
and feasible to include scientists in the HCP process26
Hardin et al do suggest, however, that SAB review may have modest
impact overall because in those cases where the HCP proposal itself is
deficient in data about the species population on the affected land, there is
not much for the SAB to work with. SAB review, however, would be more
effective if there were also (as I have proposed) specific, clear requirements
for data collection as part of all HCP proposals. With these requirements as a
backdrop, a SAB could strongly recommend against acceptance of a
25
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proposal until the required data were collected and, after they were collected,
the SAB would what it would need to make an informed assessment.
There are, to be sure, some risks with SAB review. SAB review will
add to the expense and delay to the HCP process, which may means that
some landowners who might otherwise opt for participation in the HCP
process would instead engage in quiet, preemptive destruction of habitat.
Making the SAB process efficient, with reasonably quick turnovers during
each review phase, is important to mitigate this risk. There is also a risk that
SAB review will frame the question of HCP approval as one of science only
when we know that normative questions beyond scientific analysis are
implicated by HCPs. But attention to what the available science can tell us -and that admittedly is always limited to a some degree -- is a helpful
grounding for debate and discussion of these normative questions, and SAB
review can help prompt the generation and understanding of the available
science.
Public-Private Insurance and Time Limits on HCPs
The No Surprises Rule responds to the plausible belief that
landowners will not participate in HCPs if they face the possibility of
crushing regulatory costs if approved plans do not secure species survival or
recovery or otherwise meet political demands for conservation actions in the
future. But the No Surprises Rule goes too far: it creates perverse incentives
on the part of landowners and government regulators alike.
For landowners, the No Surprises Rule creates a powerful incentive to
exclude from plans biological goals that should be part of plans, because
landowners are not financially responsible for any conservation measures
that may be required later that are outside or inconsistent with the original
plan. The No Surprises approach also creates an incentive on the part of
landowners not to invest and not to take actions voluntarily that may go
beyond the strict terms of the plan but that my help its succeed in its basic
goals, because, at most, landowners can be held responsible only for
noncompliance with the plan. Where ongoing compliance with the plan may
be hard for regulators to detect, the No Surprises Rule also may incentivize
costs savings on the part of landowners in the form of intentional non- or
sub-compliance with requirements that are plainly part of the plan.
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At the same time, the No Surprises approach creates an incentive on
the part of government actors not to know about plans that fail and species
populations that are at risk. It encourages an ostrich, head-in-the-sand
posture. Government agencies like DOI work within annual budgets and
those budgets are fully allocated before the fiscal year starts; there is no
extra money lying around. To the extent the No Surprises approach puts the
full financial responsibility on the federal government for any conservation
failures without providing any realistic funding resource for new
conservation measures, the approach seems to ask regulators to go out and
discover how plans they approved have imperiled species and then declare
that there is nothing they can do to rectify the conservation failure. It is not
realistic to expect that regulators will want to do that, and even if they did,
there still would remain the question of where the money would come from
to finance new conservation measures.
What is needed is a tool or institutional device that limits and
mitigates the financial risks for both private and public actors while
providing some incentive for landowners to take the extra step on their own
to prevent failure (where that is possible) and for government regulators to
pay attention to cases in which new conservation measures, outside of
current plans, really may be justifiable. One such mechanism would be
publically-supported but privately-operated insurance. Landowners would
pay a premium for conservation-failure insurance, and a private insurer that
operated the program would calibrate the annual premium (within a pre-set
range, to limit financial uncertainty for landowners) based on the quality of
the plan and quality of monitoring reports and the substantive meeting of
biological goals. The private market has not and would not develop
reasonably affordable insurance on its own given the nature of the risks
involved, but private insurers have worked in conjunction with government
re-insurance guarantees and underwriting in other contexts, such as in the
context of insurance against the risk of nuclear accidents and terrorism.27 In
effect, landowners and the government would make investments toward a
pool of insurance proceeds that could fund new conservation measures.
Getting premiums rights and ensuring an adequate pool of insurance funds

27

See Terrorism Insurance Act of 2002, Pub L No 107‐297 (requiring insurers not to exclude terrorism‐
relate claims and providing for the government to act as an excess insurer of terrorism‐relate claims);
Price ‐Anderson Act, 42 USC Sec 2210, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (requiring nuclear
power provider to carry an insurance and providing for federal payment of insurance claims in excess of
the private insurance mandated by the statute)
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would not be easy, but some efforts in this regard would be an improvement
over the No Surprises approach.
Finally, DOI, through notice and comment rulemaking, should
establish some criteria for time limits on HCPs. There should be some
effort to connect levels of long-term uncertainty with time limits and a flat
ban on plan lengths such as fifty years (the length of the massive Plum
Creek HCP), which are almost certainly longer than an be defended given
our current understandings and almost certainly longer than is needed to
elicit cooperation from landowners.
Conservation Banking
Smaller-scale, lower-impact HCPs pose special regulatory challenges
for several reasons. First, unless cost pooling arrangements can be made,
economies of scale and investment values are such that the landowners in
such cases will not invest too much in developing or implementing an HCP.
They may be unable to afford reasonable plan mitigation/conservation
measures, let alone the insurance premiums I have just suggested. And these
smaller plans also pose huge enforcement/compliance issues: neither
regulators nor NGOs can be expected to pay much attention to them or
perhaps even keep track of them, and as a result, the temptations on the part
of some landowners to skimp on compliance investments may be very
powerful.
One response to the small-scale-plan challenges is to suggest that we
have no small-scale HCPs.28 Another, preferable approach, would be to
allow reasonable, smaller-scale HCPs and seek to ensure compliance
through selective auditing, while also openly recognizing that the
uncertainties of achieving biological goals through these sorts of plans can
only be limited to a point through formal monitoring requirements. To
offset the biological "slippage" inherent in small scale plans, DOI could
require landowners with such plans to make one-time financial contributions
to a conservation mitigation bank, preferably in the same region and
preferable containing similar mixes of species.
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A conservation mitigation bank typically has been and would be a
large land holding managed for conservation purposes. Because such bank
holdings are large and largely if not necessarily exclusively dedicated to
conservation, they are an ideal site for the application of adaptive
management techniques and relatively easy for regulators to oversee. As
Ruhl et al explain, "[c]onservation banks, in comparison to the piecemeal
approach [to species mitigation], generally can be expected to result in larger
preserves and thus better habitat connectivity."29 Conservation banks, in
effect, can serve as insurance for failure or lack of conservation achievement
in smaller scale HCPs.
There is a limited track record for conservation banks to date,
however, and many theoretical objections to their use. Like wetland
mitigation banking, but even more so, conservation banking raises difficult
questions of locality and incommensurability: one pair of endangered birds
in one location is not, ecologically or in terms of benefits to the surrounding
human community, necessarily the same as another pair hundreds of miles
away. Nor is conservation banking free from the objection that the
conservation they afford might have happened anyway because they
invariably involve preservation of habitat rather than creation of it and they
may be located in areas with low-development demand or where there are
already other development restrictions. Assessing how much credits should
be required and how much they should costs as a component of any given
HCPs also may prove difficult.
The Department of Interior has approved specific conservation banks,
but there has been no attempt to develop regulatory criteria for judging bank
success or efforts to measure and report on success or lack of it. There is not
even an official, complete database of approved banks. As to the question of
how and when conservation banking should be used as part of HCPs, there
have been no notice-and-comment regulations, and the guidance documents
that have been issued are incomplete and somewhat confusing, at least
according to some critics. To the extent the guidance suggest anything it
suggests a restrictive attitude toward the use of conservation banks.30
Adopting rules after notice and comment that clarify criteria for banks and
29
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the use of conservation banking in HCPs would help make conservation
banking a helpful insurance policy element for small scale HCPs.
Conservation banking can be part of the response to the long-term
uncertainty problem posed by some kinds of HCPs.
CONCLUSION
The HCP program is a major way that conservation on private land
has been achieved in the United States, including conservation that moves
beyond the limited approach of the ESA in focusing only upon trainwreck
instances where a species is on the brink of extinction. We do not how well
or not HCPs are working but we can find out, with some straightforward
reforms, such as a mandated public database, and we can ensure that future
HCPs are produced with scientific review and include key components such
as biological goals and adaptive management. We can also address the
excessive inattention to long-term uncertainty in the HCP program through
insurance mandates and conservation banking.
To a very substantial extent these reforms must in the first instance be
legislative, not regulatory. The statutory basis of the HCP program as it is
now is quite modest, and for a reformed HCP program to avoid the legal
legitimacy questions that now surround the HCP program, it needs
Congressional authorization. Moreover, because some of the reforms
proposed would force agencies to do what as a natural matter they do not
want to do (e.g., engage on non-discretionary reporting to report to
Congress) and would require new government funding (e.g.,the public
funding for public-private conservation-failure insurance), one cannot expect
the agencies to act without Congressional action first. Moreover, the HCP
program and the proposed reforms raise fundamental normative questions
that deserve public debate and deliberation and, while notice and comment
rulemaking can be an important site of such debate and deliberation,
Congress, as a national elected body, is the better suited for debate and
deliberation (for all Congress' flaws). Much of the hard work of HCP
reform will be done via agency rulemaking and other initiatives, but we need
Congress to take on the project of HCP reform.
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